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1. Background and Introduction 
Governments in several countries, the World Bank and other multilateral financing 
agencies, donors and other institutions, such as the Global Water Partnership, are 
promoting river basin organizations in the spirit of “river basin management at the lowest 
appropriate level.”  This has especially been taking place since the Dublin Conference in 
1992, which postulated that centralized approaches to river basin and water resources 
management had not achieved expected performance outcomes (ICWE, 1992). 
 Pursuing integrated water resource management (IWRM) at the river basin scale 
and enhancing stakeholder involvement are two of the most widely repeated 
recommendations in the water resources literature of the last decade if not longer.  Basin 
management is often associated also with the concept of decentralization, of managing 
water resources at the “lowest appropriate level” (e.g., ICWE 1992; World Bank 1993; 
Mody 2004).  As used in this study, decentralization has two components.  One is 
organizing management responsibilities at the river basin scale, which often involves 
devolution of authority from a central government.2  The other is involving stakeholders 
within the basin in decision making and/or operations concerning water resource 
management activities. 
 “Stakeholders” is a convenient term that encompasses a wide array of individuals 
and organizations that would otherwise be awkward to identify separately for each case 
throughout a paper such as this one.  Some stakeholders are individual water users, and 
others are organizations or groups of water users (e.g., utilities, industries, irrigation 
associations).  Also, there are nongovernmental organizations that may not be directly 
involved with water use but have related interests in environmental protection, 
community development, and so on.  Still other stakeholders in a basin are governmental 
bodies with water resource management responsibilities and authority, or with 
responsibilities for related concerns such as public health, environmental protection, 
economic development, land use, etc.  Even central government officials or ministries 
may be stakeholders in a basin where the central government has substantial interests, 
facilities, or prior involvement. 
 Several conceptual arguments have been presented in favor of basin-level 
management and stakeholder involvement.  These include assertions that the whole array 
of resources and use patterns in the basin will be taken into account, management 
decisions will be based on better knowledge of local conditions, and stakeholder support 
for and cooperation with management efforts will be greater (ICWE 1992, World Bank 
1993).  Stakeholder participation is believed to be related to more sustainable use of 
water resources and improved water management outcomes. 
 In connecting the organization of basin management, devolution of central 
government authority, and stakeholder participation, there are several related questions.  
What factors might affect the likelihood of stakeholder involvement really contributing to 
effective basin-level resource management (as distinct from mere stakeholder 
consultation, or the collapse of stakeholder involvement altogether)?  What are the 
                                                 
2 Usually this will be a national government, but there are circumstances where the relevant “central 
government” devolving authority to a basin-level organization would be a regional government such as a 
state or province within which the river basin is located. 
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enabling – or disabling – conditions for effective stakeholder participation to come 
about?  If stakeholder involvement is translated into basin-level management, how can 
the active involvement and effective resource management be sustained over time and 
changing conditions?  What factors might account for the longevity of decentralized 
arrangements in some cases and their demise in others? 
 This research study is one effort to take stock of decentralization attempts in order 
to evaluate under which conditions decentralization has come about, and with what 
results.  To that end, the study includes river basins where organizations have been 
developed at the basin scale (in some cases, sub-basin also) and where those 
organizations perform (or coordinate the performance of) management functions such as 
planning, allocation and/or pricing of water supplies, flood prevention and/or response, 
and water quality monitoring and improvement.  The study is expected to inform decision 
makers engaged in on-going and planned activities in this regard, and make a 
contribution to improved river basin management. 
 Several institutional and political variables are relevant to such an effort, and are 
incorporated in a theoretical framework used in this study.3  The variables represent 
political and institutional factors that can and should be incorporated into an account of 
the success or failure of decentralization initiatives in water resource management.  These 
variables and their hypothesized relationships come from theoretical and, in some cases, 
empirical studies of water and other natural resource management, several of which are 
summarized and presented in Mody (2004). 
 This paper presents that theoretical framework, and compares the approaches to 
river basin governance and management adopted in the following river basins: the Alto-
Tietê and Jaguaribe River Basins, Brazil; the Brantas River Basin, East Java, Indonesia; 
the Fraser River Basin, British Columbia, Canada; the Guadalquivir River Basin, Spain; 
the Murray-Darling River Basin, Australia; the Tárcoles River Basin, Costa Rica, and; 
the Warta River Basin, Poland.4  The analysis focuses on how river basin management 
has been organized and pursued in each case in light of its specific geographical, 
historical and organizational contexts and the evolution of institutional arrangements.  
                                                 
3 Although integrated into the discussion below of hypothesized relationships, the variables include: level 
of national economic development; level of basin economic development; distribution of resource 
endowments among basin stakeholders; cultural or other differences among individuals or groups whose 
cooperation or coordination is needed; histories of interactions among individuals and groups, and their 
anticipations about future interactions; norms of trust and reciprocity; whether decentralization initiatives 
were top-down, bottom-up, or mutual; involvement of existing community institutions; basin-level 
financial autonomy (including whether revenues generated within the basin are retained there for basin 
management activities); familiarity or experience of basin stakeholders with provision and management of 
other services or resources; whether and to what extent basin stakeholders can create or modify institutional 
arrangements; and adequate time for implementation and adaptation of new arrangements. 
4 The eight case studies employ a single theoretical framework, as part of the study “Integrated River Basin 
Management and the Principle of Managing Water Resources at the Lowest Appropriate Level – When and 
Why Does It (Not) Work in Practice?” funded by the World Bank.  Policy Research Working Papers on 
each case study have been composed: the Guadalquivir Basin in Spain (Blomquist et al. 2004a), the Warta 
Basin in Poland (Blomquist et al. 2004b), the Brantas Basin in Indonesia (Bhat et al. 2005), the Tárcoles 
Basin in Costa Rica (Blomquist et al. 2004e), the Murray Darling Basin in Australia (Blomquist et al. 
2004c), the Fraser Basin in Canada (Blomquist et al., 2004d), and the Alto Tietê and Jaguaribe Basins in 
Brazil (Formiga Johnsson and Kemper, 2005a, b). 
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The cases are also compared and assessed for their observed degrees of success in 
achieving improved stakeholder participation and IWRM. 
 After this introductory section, Section 2 presents the theoretical framework 
applied in this research study, and Section 3 briefly explains why and how a comparative 
case-study approach was used to explore that theoretical framework in empirical settings.  
Section 4 provides an overview of some characteristics of the eight cases, and Section 5 
presents our overall comparative findings and conclusions.  Section 6 describes some 
implications of this study for future research and policymaking.  An appendix contains 
additional information about each case in relation to four major elements of the 
theoretical framework. 
2. Theoretical Framework5 
Successful, sustainable, cooperative river basin management is clearly a challenge.  It 
depends upon a combination of factors that include, at a minimum the incentives of 
central government officials to participate in and support the devolution of authority to 
basin- and subbasin-scale organizations, the incentives of stakeholders within the basin to 
assume and maintain responsibilities for participating in decision making and the 
implementation of management activities, and enabling conditions such as a legal 
framework and the economic resources to make the intended management improvements 
possible in the first place, and then sustainable over time. 
 Drawing upon insights from institutional analysis, and particularly from the 
literature relating to natural resource management and decentralized systems (Ostrom 
1990, 1992; Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; 
Wunsch 1991), the study team has identified a number of factors that may be associated 
with those incentives and conditions.    Other analytical approaches are available for such 
a study—political economy, game theory, etc.  The study team adopted the institutional 
analysis framework because its focus on institutional development as a collective 
outcome of individual choices made within a social, cultural and political-economic 
framework seemed best suited to a study intended to illuminate the origin and evolution, 
as well as the performance, of river basin institutions. 
 The team has developed a framework from which hypothesized relationships can 
be drawn, linking those factors to the prospects for successful river basin management in 
decentralized systems.  In that framework, four sets of variables are identified under the 
following major headings: 
• Contextual factors and initial conditions 
• Characteristics of the decentralization process 
• Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
• The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements. 
 As shown in Figure 1, these sets of variables are not directly linked to basin 
management success or failure, but influence incentives and conditions that are believed 
                                                 
5 A reviewer has made useful suggestions for revising the order of presentation and the names and  
descriptions of some of the variables in this section, which will be done in a future version of this paper. 
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to be linked to those outcomes.  In the remainder of this section, we describe the 
hypothesized connections between our variables of interest and the prospects for 
improved stakeholder participation and integrated water resource management organized 
at the river basin level. 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of theoretical framework (bold=categories of variables detailed 
further in Section 2) 
 
 
2.1 Contextual Factors and Initial Conditions 
The literature on natural resource management indicates that successful decentralization 
is at least partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time a 
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context of the decentralization effort. 
Level of economic development in the nation   
Although decentralization may be undertaken in the hope of reducing the central 
government’s financial outlays for river basin management, the early stages of 































decentralization may be expected to require some additional outlays in order to make the 
transition.  The central government often will need to assist basin stakeholders in 
establishing organizations and practices that will facilitate basin management. 
 Furthermore, successful decentralization does not necessarily mean terminating 
all central government water resource management functions.  Aspects of water resource 
management that have the characteristics of “public goods” may be efficiently provided 
by a central government while other aspects of water management are devolved.  
Weather monitoring and forecasting are examples of such services, but hydrological 
research, research on the health and environmental effects of water quality, and some 
aspects of flood control may also fit the description.  Whatever the combination in a 
particular location, the central government is likely to continue at least some functions 
and services even during and after a decentralization reform.  Indeed, the success of the 
decentralization reform may depend upon the maintenance of those centrally provided 
functions. 
 The level of economic development of the nation is therefore an important 
contextual variable, to the extent that it affects the financial capacity of the central 
government to bear transition costs of the decentralization initiative and ongoing costs of 
functions that support and facilitate basin-scale management.  All other things being 
equal, we would expect decentralization initiatives to be more likely to achieve 
sustainable success where the economic well-being of the nation allows the central 
government to bear those costs. 
Level of economic development of the river basin 
Decentralization also requires some commitment of financial and other resources from 
basin stakeholders.  Developing and maintaining basin-level institutional arrangements 
for water allocation, water quality protection, monitoring and enforcement will not be 
costless.  Even if the central government provides transitional or ongoing financial 
support, any true decentralization effort is likely to require some commitment of 
resources from basin stakeholders. 
 Furthermore, the literature on decentralized water resource management indicates 
that effective decentralization must include some degree of financial autonomy.  
Sustaining this autonomy often depends upon establishing some form of water pricing or 
tariffs.  Implementing a water pricing or tariff regime entails requiring at least some 
water users to pay for a resource they previously consumed for free or at greater 
subsidization. 
 Thus, developing and maintaining the institutional arrangements for basin-level 
management, and implementing any form of financial autonomy, imply that some 
financial resources at the basin level will have to be committed to the decentralization 
effort.  This in turn implies that basins where stakeholders can sustain those commitments 
are (all other things being equal) more likely to achieve sustainable success. 
Distribution of resources among basin stakeholders 
The literature on natural resource management also indicates that the initial distribution 
of resource endowments among the basin stakeholders is an important contextual factor 
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in the development and successful implementation of a decentralization initiative.  This 
variable has interesting and complex properties, however. 
 On the one hand and more obviously, extreme asymmetries in resource 
endowments among basin stakeholders can imperil decentralization success.  If some 
stakeholders are so privileged at the outset (either financially or in terms of rights to the 
basin resources or political influence over allocation of the same) as to anticipate that any 
alteration will leave them worse off, they are unlikely to participate constructively in the 
decentralization process and may even try to derail it.  If other stakeholders are so 
destitute as to be unable to bring any resources of their own to the decentralization 
initiative, they may rationally elect not to participate even though improved resource 
management would make them better off in the long run. 
 On the other hand and less obviously, some inequality of initial resource 
endowments may facilitate action by enabling some stakeholders to bear the costs of 
taking a leadership role.  Blomquist (1988) and Ostrom (1990), for example, have 
identified instances in which stakeholders with greater endowments, seeing themselves as 
having a substantial stake in the future of the resource, were willing to bear a 
disproportionate share of the initial costs of organizing institutional arrangements in order 
to stimulate movement toward a successful and sustainable management regime. 
 Thus, some asymmetry of resource endowments is not necessarily fatal to a 
decentralization initiative, and may even facilitate it if better-situated users are willing to 
assume a leadership role.  But extreme inequality may be detrimental or even fatal to the 
decentralization effort.  The distribution of endowments among stakeholders is an 
important contextual variable affecting the prospects for successful decentralization, even 
if its effects cannot be hypothesized to work in a single direction. 
Social and cultural distinctions among stakeholders 
Class, religious, or other social and cultural distinctions can affect successful 
implementation of decentralization initiatives through their effects on stakeholder 
communication, trust, and extent of prior experience in cooperative endeavors.  The 
greater and more contentious these distinctions, all other things being equal, the more 
difficult it will be to develop and sustain basin-scale institutional arrangements for 
governing and managing water resources.  This does not mean that decentralization 
efforts should be made only in relatively homogeneous settings.  We simply anticipate 
that implementation of decentralized water resource management will be more difficult in 
settings with significant social and cultural distinctions among users. 
Local experience with self-governance and service provision 
Decentralization of water resource management does not occur in a vacuum.  The ability 
of central government officials to strike a balance between supportiveness and 
intrusiveness, and the capacity of stakeholders to organize and sustain institutional 
arrangements, will depend in part on their experiences with other public services or 
responsibilities.  Because there are no cookbooks or recipes for “organizing water 
resource management at the lowest appropriate level,” the ability of central and local 
participants to perform successfully will depend on skills they have developed in other 
areas of their social lives. 
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 We would expect that water resource management decentralization initiatives are 
more likely to be implemented successfully in settings where local participants have 
experience in governing and managing other resources and/or public services—e.g., land 
uses, schooling, transportation, etc.  Successfully assuming local or basin-level 
responsibility for water resource management will not be easy under any circumstances, 
but it should be less daunting for local or basin-level stakeholders who are already 
practiced at raising, maintaining, and distributing revenues, resolving disagreements and 
taking collective decisions, maintaining common facilities, and so forth. 
2.2 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
Some characteristics of the decentralization process itself may affect the prospects for 
successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are 
devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and acceptance of that 
authority and responsibility by local entities in the basin.  Whether both occur will 
depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place. 
“Top-down,” “bottom-up,” or mutually desired devolution 
Successful implementation of a decentralization initiative may depend significantly upon 
its motivation.  In some cases, central government officials may have undertaken 
decentralization initiatives in order to solve their own problems—e.g., to reduce or 
eliminate the central government’s accountability for past or current resource policy 
failures, resolving a budgetary crisis by cutting their financial responsibility for selected 
domestic policy areas, pressure from external support agencies to formulate a 
decentralization initiative as a condition of continued financial support, etc.  In other 
cases, the decision to decentralize resource management to a lower and more appropriate 
level may have been the outcome of a process of mutual discussion and agreement 
between central officials hoping to improve performance outcomes and local stakeholders 
desiring greater autonomy and/or flexibility in managing the resource. 
 Of course, these examples are stated as extremes, and most actual settings would 
be expected to lie somewhere between.  Nevertheless, all other things being equal, we 
can anticipate that because decentralization initiatives require active stakeholder 
involvement, they are more likely to be implemented successfully when devolution is 
desired mutually by basin stakeholders and central government officials. 
Incorporation or involvement of existing local governance arrangements 
The literature suggests that stakeholder involvement is likely to be greater if traditional 
community governance institutions and practices are recognized and incorporated in the 
devolution process.  Because basin stakeholders already relate to their traditional 
community governance institutions (e.g., villages, tribes), they can be expected to be 
more willing to express their views on basin management, commit their resources to 
collective endeavors, and accept basin-level decisions as legitimate if those traditional 
institutions are engaged by the devolution and involved in the basin management regime.  
This observation has a transactions costs explanation, too: the costs (primarily in terms of 
time and effort) to basin stakeholders of relating to existing organizational forms are 
expected to be smaller than the costs of relating to an additional set of organizational 
arrangements. 
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 In contrast, decentralization initiatives that feature central government 
construction of new basin-level organizations that are largely separate from existing 
community governance institutions face higher costs in achieving stakeholders’ 
participation, resource commitments, and acceptance of decisions as legitimate.  This 
does not mean that no new organizations will have to be created in order to achieve 
basin-scale management—in fact, new organizations will often be needed to promote 
communication and integrate decision making across communities within a river basin.  
Rather, all other things being equal, decentralization initiatives are more likely to succeed 
in gaining stakeholder acceptance if they involve familiar governance institutions and 
practices. 
Consistent central government policy commitment 
Adoption and announcement of a decentralization policy—in the form of a statute or 
regulation, for instance—might occur swiftly in some cases, but in nearly all cases 
decentralization (which may entail adjustments to agency responsibilities, budgetary 
modifications, etc.) will take time.  In many countries, central government regimes 
change periodically as elections or other processes bring different top officials or 
different parties into control of central government policy making.  A potentially 
important political variable therefore is how the decentralization policy survives any 
transitions of central government power that occur during that period. 
 Broadly speaking, cases may be expected to fit one of three profiles.  The first and 
simplest is a case where no transition of central government authority occurred during the 
decentralization process.  The second is a case where central government transition 
occurred but the outgoing and incoming central government officials maintained a 
consistent commitment to the policy and its implementation.  The third is a case where 
central government transition occurred but there was a noticeable discontinuity in the 
central government’s behavior with regard to the decentralization policy. 
 It is not clear exactly how the implementation success of cases of the first profile 
would differ from those of the second, but we can expect that cases of the third type 
would be less likely to exhibit successful implementation of decentralization than the first 
two types, all other things being equal.  Discontinuities in central government policy 
commitments can disrupt support, confuse the missions and operations of central-
government agencies involved in resource management, and undermine the confidence of 
stakeholders in the decentralization initiative. 
2.3 Central government and basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary central and local actions, 
other aspects of the central-local relationship can be expected to condition that success.  
Thus, our theoretical framework considers additional political and institutional variables 
having to do with the respective capacities of the central government and the basin 
stakeholders, and with the relationship between them. 
The extent of actual devolution 
A decentralization policy initiative announced by a central government may be only 
symbolic, amounting to little more than words on paper while the central government 
retains in practice control over all significant resource management decisions.  Worse 
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still, a decentralization policy can represent an abandonment of central government 
responsibility for resource management without a concomitant establishment of local 
level authority.6  In better situations, stakeholders acquire both authority and 
responsibility for aspects of resource management. 
 These differences in the extent of actual devolution can be expected to affect the 
prospects for success.  Symbolic or abandonment policies are at best unlikely to improve 
resource management, and at worst will undermine stakeholder willingness to commit to 
and sustain the active involvement necessary for success (e.g., Vermillion and Garces-
Restropo 1998 on Colombia).  Assessing the extent of actual devolution is a challenge, of 
course, and is more of a qualitative than quantitative undertaking.  Nevertheless, we 
anticipate that the degree of actual devolution of resource management responsibilities to 
the basin level is associated with greater likelihood of success. 
Financial resources and autonomy at the basin level 
As noted, decentralization of resource management means at least some assumption of 
financial responsibilities by basin organizations and stakeholders, and some acquisition 
and exercise on their part of decision making authority over at least some of the financial 
resources they commit.  If they lack autonomy to determine how funds shall be spent on 
resource management activities, the question is open whether meaningful decentralization 
has occurred.   
 On the other hand, decentralization does not have to mean that basin 
organizations and stakeholders become solely responsible for all resource management 
funding.  In many instances, a complete transfer of financial responsibility and support 
for resource management from the central government to local organizations would be 
catastrophic for the latter and for resource management.  One of the indicators of central 
government support for decentralization can be the central government’s willingness to 
provide some financial assistance to basin-level organizations without intrusive control 
over basin-level decisions about the priorities on which those funds shall be spent. 
 Thus, while logic and experience suggest that basin organizations must have some 
financial resources and autonomy for decentralization initiatives to be implemented 
successfully, this is not a variable that can be arrayed unidirectionally.  Rather, all other 
things being equal, we would expect to see the greatest prospects for success somewhere 
toward the middle of a spectrum where complete central government funding and control 
lie at one pole and complete basin-level funding and control lie at the other.7 
                                                 
6 This is distinct from the discussion in the previous section about the motivation for the decentralization 
policy.  A central government might adopt a decentralization policy out of sincere motivations and in 
consultation with local stakeholders, but nevertheless fail for other reasons to actually relinquish any 
control over resource management or establish local authority. 
7 An optional further refinement of this variable would involve inquiring not only about the gross 
proportions of funding between central and local agencies but about how funding relates to resource 
management functions.  In this refinement, successful implementation of decentralization in water resource 
management would be linked to central government funding and control of functions that are best 
organized at a larger scale because of their high capital or technical requirements (e.g., conducting 
hydrogeological surveys or developing water quality standards) and basin-level funding and control of 
functions that are best organized on a smaller scale because of their time-and-place specificity or socio-
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Basin-level authority to create and modify institutional arrangements 
Decentralization is unlikely to succeed if undertaken with a “one size fits all” mentality.  
Institutional arrangements at the basin level—for governance, financing, monitoring, 
infrastructure construction and maintenance, etc.—are more likely to function effectively 
if tailored to the particular physical, social, and economic setting of each basin.  They are 
also more likely to function effectively for long periods—to be sustainable—if they can 
be modified in response to changed conditions.  Thus a key element is the extent to which 
local communities can design and implement their own institutional arrangements. 
 Successful implementation of decentralization is likely to be a function of that 
local autonomy, for two reasons.  First, while it is conceivable that central government 
officials could successfully design and alter institutional arrangements for each basin, as 
a practical matter the information requirements of such a task are extremely high.  
Second, the ability to craft their own institutional arrangements can be expected to attract 
more active involvement from basin-level stakeholders compared with the option of 
merely assuming positions or roles in institutional settings designed by someone else.8 
 Plainly, the characteristics of the central-local relationship are complex, but it is a 
critical variable in relation to the prospects for successful decentralization.  All other 
things being equal, we expect to find successful and sustainable implementation of 
decentralization initiatives more often in settings where stakeholders are empowered to 
craft institutional arrangements for resource management at the basin and sub-basin 
levels (including cross-jurisdictional arrangements), and modify them as needed. 
Distribution of national-level political influence among stakeholders 
The effectiveness of basin-level institutional arrangements will be a function of 
stakeholder commitment to them.  This includes stakeholder willingness to abide for the 
time being by decisions or actions taken by those basin-level institutions, even when the 
stakeholder disagrees or would have preferred something different.  This degree of 
commitment is essential to the maintenance of trust and reciprocity among stakeholders, 
                                                                                                                                                 
cultural implications (e.g., decisions about allocation of water between different sectors, monitoring of 
individuals’ or households’ water use, maintenance of infrastructure facilities, etc.). 
8 Two extensions or implications of this logic should be mentioned.  First, the creation of effective basin-
scale arrangements will often require the ability to establish cross-jurisdictional or inter-jurisdictional 
institutions, since basin boundaries may not conform neatly to the boundaries of existing political or 
administrative jurisdictions.  Accordingly, the central-local relationship confers greater autonomy on basin-
level stakeholders to create and modify institutional arrangements for decentralized water resource 
management if it includes the authority to develop cross-jurisdictional arrangements than if it does not.  
Second, the authority to create and modify institutional arrangements may not extend only to basin-scale 
arrangements.  Basin-level stakeholders may also discern the need for or utility of some sub-basin 
arrangements, and the central-local relationship confers greater autonomy on basin-level stakeholders if it 
also allows them to create and modify these as well.   One limitation of this logic should also be mentioned.  
The more organizations stakeholders create, the greater the transaction costs of maintaining all of them and 
coordinating their activities.  We do not therefore anticipate that stakeholders will create new institutional 
arrangements to match the scope and scale of each and every management function.  They may quite 
rationally opt to rely on some existing institutions to conduct management functions even though boundary 
and other considerations seem to be less than perfectly fitted to the task, in order to limit transaction costs 
to a manageable level. 
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which is in turn vital to the success of the basin-level institutions on which decentralized 
management depends. 
 That commitment can be undermined when stakeholders have asymmetrical 
access to central-government influence.  If some stakeholders but not others can apply 
political influence with central officials to block or overturn or exempt them from basin 
management decisions with which they disagree, or structure advantages on their behalf 
relative to other stakeholders, bargaining among stakeholders over resource management 
decisions will not be conducted in good faith and resource management policies will not 
be enforced fairly.  The trust and reciprocity beliefs that underlie sustainable local 
arrangements can be expected to erode quickly, taking the prospects for successful 
decentralization with them.  All other things being equal, we would expect to more often 
find successful implementation of decentralized management in settings where 
stakeholders had relatively symmetrical political influence with the central government. 
Characteristics of the water rights system 
It may be possible to find settings where all aspects of water allocation, including (formal 
or informal)9 rights of use, are defined at the local level among basin stakeholders, but it 
is more likely that at least some aspects of water allocation are defined within a context 
of national rules establishing rights of use (or state or provincial rules in federal systems).  
The nature of those centrally-determined rights will have important implications for the 
implementation of decentralized resource management.  Characteristics of water rights 
systems can make it easier or harder for water users to agree upon, maintain, and enforce 
agreements that regulate use or require contributions to collective action. 
 Quantification of water rights is such a characteristic.  Quantified water rights 
systems assign rights to a particular amount of water use; non-quantified water rights 
systems may simply define allowed uses or establish ordinal priorities among users.  
Advantages of quantified rights systems include relative clarity and certainty among 
users about who may use what, and in the assignment of tariffs or other fees.10 
Adequate time for implementation and adaptation 
Longevity of water resource management arrangements may reflect their success, but 
their success may also depend on their longevity.  Time is needed to develop basin-scale 
institutional arrangements, to experiment with alternatives and engage in trial-and-error 
learning.  Time is needed for trust building, so water users begin to accept new 
                                                 
9 The expression “formal or informal” is used here to distinguish between “rights” that are institutionalized 
to the point of legal cognition and enforceability, and “rights” that are norms of entitlement or obligation.  
Our use of the word “rights” is not meant to specify the former or exclude the latter.  For our purposes, 
what is important is not the form in which the right is expressed, but its recognition as binding among 
stakeholders. 
10 Another characteristic related to ease of reaching resource management agreements is whether the water 
rights system allows carry-over of unused water rights from one time period to another.  “Use it or lose it” 
systems, in which water not used in the current period cannot be claimed or used in a later period, create 
unhelpful incentives for water users—e.g., trying to enlarge their rights (even resorting to cheating or 
waste) to guard against uncertainty, over-investing in conveyance capacity and under-investing in storage 
capacity, etc.  Systems which assure water users that forgoing some use today will not diminish their future 
right, or even allow them to store water in one period for use in the next, lower the costs of reaching and 
sustaining allocation agreements among users. 
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arrangements and gradually commit to sustaining them.  And time is needed for resource 
management actions to be translated into observable and sustained effects on resource 
conditions.  Several successful examples of basin-level institutions, including some in 
this study, took decades to design and implement. 
 The relationship between time and success is complex, though.  As noted earlier, 
adaptability is important; water users need to be able to modify arrangements in response 
to changed conditions.  On the other hand, patience is important, too—changing 
institutions quickly because a new approach that has not succeeded can erode 
stakeholders’ willingness to commit their time and effort to the next reform.  We are not 
in a position to specify a “magic number” of years, quarters, months, or whatever that 
central governments and basin stakeholders should bear with a decentralization effort in 
order to see it bear fruit.  But time must be taken into account as a factor likely to 
influence the success of implementation of decentralization initiatives. 
2.4 The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend 
on features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or central 
government officials. 
Presence of basin-level governance institutions 
A prerequisite of successful resource management is governance—arrangements by 
which stakeholders articulate interests, share information, communicate and bargain, and 
take collective decisions.  Basin-level governance is essential to the ability of water users 
to operate at multiple levels of action, which is a key to sustained successful resource 
preservation and efficient use (Ostrom 1990).  Water management at the basin level is 
less likely to be achievable nor sustainable without the establishment and maintenance of 
basin-scale governance arrangements.  The existence of governance arrangements is a 
necessary rather than a sufficient condition, however, and we do not expect to find 
success everywhere we find basin-scale organizations.  
Clarity of institutional boundaries and match to basin boundaries 
This variable refers to an institutional characteristic, namely, whether and to what extent 
the institutional arrangements for water resource management have boundaries that are 
clearly defined and reasonably well matched to the basin.  This is one of the variables 
identified by Ostrom (1990) as a feature of long-enduring common-pool resource 
management institutions. 
 The importance of boundaries and their fit to the resource derives from their 
relationship to collective decision making.  Ill-defined or poorly-fitted boundaries may 
include in collective decision making individuals or communities who are not actually in 
the basin, or exclude others who are.  Either mismatch detracts from the efficiency and 
efficacy of collective decision making arrangements—needed information is missing, 
extraneous information is included, arrangements for distributing costs and benefits 
cannot approach complete fairness, and some users can exploit others with impunity.  All 
other things being equal, we would expect to find successful implementation of 
decentralized water resource management in cases where basin-level institutions have 
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clearly defined boundaries that are reasonably well-matched to basin boundaries, and 
where responsibilities of organizations within the basin are clear to the stakeholders.  
Recognition of sub-basin communities of interest 
Although water resources within a basin are interrelated, water users have distinct 
communities of interest.  Downstream users’ perspectives on water quality differ from 
upstreamers.  Water users in an area overlying groundwater resources have different 
views of drought exposure than users in other parts of the basin.  Municipal and industrial 
users perceive the value of water supply reliability differently than agricultural users do.  
 These distinctions have implications for the prospects of securing stakeholders’ 
commitment to decentralized water resource management arrangements, and thus to the 
success and sustainability of those arrangements.  Thus, while basin-level governance 
and management arrangements are essential, the recognition of sub-basin communities of 
interest may be nearly as important. 
 Recognition can include mere representation (i.e., a guaranteed voice in basin 
decisions), but it need not be limited to that.  Basin-level decision making arrangements 
can also be constructed to assure that communities of interest must reach agreement on 
resource management decisions.  This deeper level of recognition can help prevent 
situations where one community of interest within a basin is able to exploit another, 
which can certainly happen under a simpler decision rule such as a majority vote. 
 Of course, transaction costs increase as such assurances are issued to each sub-
group within a collectivity, so this variable too would likely reach and pass a threshold 
beyond which additional institutionalized recognitions of sub-basin communities become 
counter-productive.  Short of that threshold, though, recognition of sub-basin 
communities of interest and the adoption of basin-level decision making arrangements 
that minimize the prospects of one group exploiting another should support the trust and 
reciprocity that are important to the emergence and sustainability of basin-level 
arrangements in decentralized water resource management systems. 
Availability of fora for information sharing and communication 
Especially in water resource management, where there can be many indicators of water 
resource conditions and management performance, fora for information sharing are vital 
to reducing information asymmetries and promoting cooperation.  Since information will 
not automatically be perceived the same way by all stakeholders, and the implications of 
information about resource conditions will differ among communities of interest within 
the basin, it is also important that there be regular fora in which basin stakeholders can 
communicate.   All other things being equal, we expect to find successful examples of 
decentralized water resource management more frequently among cases where there are 
basin-level fora for information sharing and communication among stakeholders. 
Availability of fora for conflict resolution 
Disagreements among stakeholders will arise in any natural resource management 
setting.  The success and sustainability of decentralized management efforts therefore 
depend also on the presence of fora for airing and resolving conflicts.  All other things 
being equal, successful implementation of decentralized management is more likely in 
settings where institutional arrangements include fora for conflict resolution. 
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3. Case Study Methodology 
The factors discussed above will not all affect with equal significance the decentralization 
in each location.  The emergence and path of river basin management will be affected 
profoundly by some of these variables, slightly by others, and not at all by some.  A case 
study approach was pursued for this study in order to examine closely the processes of 
institutional change as well as the current situation.  Institutional analysis in a case-study 
setting consists largely of determining which institutional factors in what combination 
appear to have been linked to outcomes.  Furthermore, many of the variables listed above 
have subjective components, and would be assessed differently by different participants 
and observers.  It therefore has been essential in these case studies to interview several 
individuals with a variety of perspectives. 
 Team members conducted site visits to each basin.  Visits were preceded by the 
selection of an area expert who prepared a background paper on the basin and arranged 
interviews with basin stakeholders.  Background papers for all case study visits are based 
on a common outline.  During the site visits, team members conducted interviews 
focused on understanding the processes of institutional origin and change, and the 
performance of water management institutions at sub-basin, basin, and national scales, 
matters that were within the knowledge of the interviewees.  Each visit was used also for 
collection of published material on the basin.  After each visit, team members combined 
their notes from the interviews, revisited and revised the basin background paper, 
reviewed other materials, and composed working papers summarizing and analyzing each 
case (Blomquist et al. 2004abcde; Bhat et al. 2004; Formiga-Johnsson and Kemper 
2005ab).  Those working papers are thus based on a combination of sources—
documentary materials on the basin and the various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations at work there, the background paper prepared for the visit, and the 
interviews conducted during the site visit.  The purpose of this comparison paper is to 
draw together information across the cases relating to the theoretical framework 
developed for and employed in this research study. 
4. Summary Data on Characteristics of the River Basin Organizations, 
Decentralization Reforms, and Approaches to Stakeholder Involvement 
The cases in this study varied on a number of dimensions.  In this section, we present 
some summary information about the eight cases, beginning with the principal water 
management problems confronted by basin stakeholders.  Efforts to compare and assess 
the experiences of these cases in implementing integrated water resource management at 
the river basin level must begin with an understanding of what problems water users and 
managers have been attempting to solve. 
 Table 1 presents the three or four most important water management challenges in 
each basin, as understood from our background research and our interviews during site 
visits.  For each basin, problems are listed in order of decreasing priority or severity 
(thus, for example, pollution appears as a problem in five of the cases but is listed first for 
cases such as Brantas and Warta, while it appears in the Guadalquivir case as a lower 
priority concern than scarcity).  In some basins, water supply problems received greatest 
emphasis in the design and operation of management efforts, in others water quality. 
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Table 1. Principal water management problems faced in each basin 
AltoTietê (Brazil) Pollution, urban development in headwaters, scarcity, flooding 
Brantas (Indonesia) Pollution, flooding, seasonal water scarcity 
Fraser (Canada) Flooding, pollution, inter-sectoral conflict 
Guadalquivir (Spain) Scarcity and water allocation, drought exposure, flooding, 
pollution 




Scarcity and water allocation, inter-sectoral conflict, river 
ecology 
Tárcoles  (Costa Rica) Pollution, flooding, erosion 
Warta (Poland) Pollution, flooding, seasonal water scarcity, drought exposure 
 
 The cases also differed on a variable that our theoretical framework regarded as 
potentially significant: whether the development of institutional arrangements for water 
management at the basin level had originated as a central government reform effort, or as 
an effort initiated by stakeholders within the basin.  Although categorizing them 
dichotomously overlooks subtleties and compresses multiple influences present in some 
cases, Table 2 distinguishes usefully between the origins of the basin management 
reforms in the eight cases.  The Brazilian cases (Jaguaribe and Alto Tietê) require some 
additional notation because of the federal nature of Brazil’s governmental structure: 
creation of basin institutions originated with state government action in those basins 
rather than directly from national government action; nevertheless, this would correspond 
in our theoretical framework with a “top-down” initiative rather than one started within 
the basin by stakeholders.11 
 
Table 2. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Creation of Basin Organization 
Central-government initiated Stakeholder initiated 
Brantas Fraser 
Guadalquivir Murray-Darling 
Warta Tárcoles  
Jaguaribe (national-to-state, then state-to-local)  




 Where a central government initiated the development of basin management 
arrangements, it could have occurred as a singular act applying to just one basin or as part 
of a broader water policy reform—for example, creating basin-scale organizations 
throughout the country as Poland has done.  These distinctions are presented in Table 3.  
                                                 
11 By contrast, the origin of institutions in the Murray-Darling case started with the states in their role as 
basin stakeholders contesting over supply allocation from an interstate river.  Thus for our purposes state-
initiated action in that case is classified as stakeholder-initiated action.  The state-initiated actions in the 
Brazil cases involved a state government directing the creation of a basin management organization within 
its borders in much the same fashion as a national government might create one in a unitary system 
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Not surprisingly, the three stakeholder-initiated cases from Table 2 all appear in Table 3 
as cases where creation of basin management arrangements was specific to that basin. 
   





Warta Tárcoles  
Jaguaribe  
Alto Tietê  
 
 It also became apparent that, for some cases, supranational organizations such as 
The World Bank and the European Union had been influential in the development or 
modification of basin management programs or institutions.  Both Spain and Poland have 
moved substantially toward IWRM (particularly in regard to water quality protection and 
water pricing) in response to the EU Water Framework Directive.  World Bank 
promotion of IWRM and stakeholder involvement influenced the creation of the basin 
management organizations in Ceará state in Brazil (the Jaguaribe case) and the continuity 
of the basin management corporation approach in Indonesia (the Brantas case). The 
Interamerican Development Bank supported the Tárcoles Commission. A World Bank-
financed project in the state of Sao Paulo supported the development of legislation that 
would have influence on the instruments for riverbasin management in the Alto Tietê 
basins and on its institutions, such as the Headwaters Protection Law and the water 
pricing law. 
 
Table 4. Presence of Supra-National Influence on Creation of Basin Institutions 
Supra-national influence present Supra-national influence not present 
Brantas (World Bank) Murray-Darling 
Guadalquivir (EU) Fraser 
Warta (EU)  
Jaguaribe (World Bank)  
Tárcoles (IADB)  
Alto Tietê (World Bank)  
 
                                                 
12 The decentralization reform in Indonesia started only after the process started in the Brantas basin. 
Nevertheless, especially the broader process has had a major influence in recent years, including deepening 
the deconcentration process to a real decentralization process in the Brantas basin. 
13 Initial creation of the basin management agency in the Guadalquivir case occurred in concert with the 
central government’s creation of a number of such agencies in 1926-27.  Significant reorganization of the 




 Basin-scale organizations have been created in each of the eight cases, but they 
differ in structure and type.  Each basin organization is described at length and in detail 
(see their corresponding Working Papers).  Table 5 truncates those descriptions for ease 
of comparison.  As shown, two of the cases featured state companies, two involved 
central government agencies operating within nationally-defined basin boundaries, and 
the other four were unique variations (one inter-governmental commission, one quasi-
governmental commission, one nongovernmental basin council, and one hybrid basin 
committee/basin agency structure). 
 
Table 5. Nature of basin organization 
Alto Tietê River basin committee supported by a river basin agency 
Brantas State company, under supervision of national water resources agency 
Fraser Nongovernmental organization 
Guadalquivir Central government agency at basin scale 
Jaguaribe River basin committees and commissions supported by a state water 
resources management company 
Murray-
Darling 
Intergovernmental basin commission, with a self-financed division for 
operating infrastructure on Murray River stem 
Tárcoles  Quasi-governmental river basin commission recognized by central 
government 
Warta Central government agency at basin scale 
 
 Because IWRM at the river basin level could involve a range of responsibilities 
and activities, it is not surprising that the cases we studied differed in the functions they 
perform.  Some had authority to allocate water to users and others did not.  Many but not 
all were responsible for water quality.  A few were engaged in setting and/or collecting 
water tariffs.  Some operated dams, reservoirs, and other physical facilities.  Table 6 
indicates which among six types of responsibilities were performed by the basin-scale 
organizations studied in the eight cases.  The only function performed by all was 
planning and coordination—all developed basin management plans and/or coordinated 
activities among multiple governmental and nongovernmental entities present within the 
basins. 
 Although management at the basin level is uniformly promoted as a way of 
increasing stakeholder involvement, there is no similarly uniform prescription for how 
this should be done.  As expected, the eight cases we studied demonstrated a variety of 
means of organizing stakeholder participation and soliciting stakeholder input into basin 
management decisions, summarized in Table 7.  Two of the cases, Brantas and Warta, 
had no established stakeholder organization (committee or other type) during the time of 
our study, although one (Brantas) had a program of outreach and communication between 
basin agency personnel and various individual stakeholders in the basin and the other 
(Warta) is now developing a regional water management council under the direction of a 
national law governing the structure and operation of basin management agencies.  Other 
cases, such as the Alto Tietê and Fraser basins, had elaborate and multi-scale structures.  
Jaguaribe had numerous sub-basin user committees and commissions, but only the State 
Water Resources Management Company (which provides technical support to these) 
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operates at the basin scale, and Murray-Darling has a basinwide Community Advisory 
Committee but not sub-basin ones.  The Guadalquivir and Tárcoles cases have ostensibly 
representative structures incorporating a variety of stakeholders, although interviewees 
indicated that some bodies did not meet regularly and that the most broadly 
representative ones may not have substantial input into basin management decisions. 
 




































































































































14 X    X  
Brantas X X X   X 
Fraser X      
Guadalqui
vir 
X X X X  X 
Jaguaribe
15 
X X X X  X 
Murray-
Darling 
X X  X   
Tárcoles  X      
Warta X X   X  
 
 Similarly varied are the means and sources of funding for the basin organizations in 
the eight cases.  As shown in Table 8, three (Alto Tietê, Tárcoles, and Warta) rely solely 
on central government budget allocations at present, although there have been other 
sources for the Tárcoles basin commission in the past, and the basin agency and 
committee in Alto Tietê are supposed to have revenue from water charges in the future.  
Three others (Brantas, Guadalquivir, and Murray-Darling) enjoy a combination of central 
government support and water user charges.  One (Jaguaribe) is funded entirely by water 
user charges, although those are collected by the state water resources management 
agency and then reallocated to the basin.  The nongovernmental Fraser Basin Council 
obviously lacks the authority to levy taxes or charges on water use, and instead receives 







                                                 
14 The functions marked are those performed by the basin agency, as distinct from the basin committee. 
15 The functions marked are those performed by the basin agency, as distinct from the basin committee. 
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Table 7. Organizational structure of stakeholder involvement 
Alto Tietê Basin committee and five regional subcommittees, with 
representation from civil society, state and local government 
Brantas No stakeholder advisory group or organization, but different 
government entities representing different user sectors; basin 
organization has stakeholder outreach program for communication 
Fraser Multi-sector council with representation from basin sub-regions, 
water use sectors, and all levels of government; regional councils 
Guadalquivir Water Users Assembly, and several basin commissions and councils 
with seats for water user groups, civil society, and central government
Jaguaribe Numerous user commissions at reservoir and valley scales, plus sub-
basin committees 
Murray-Darling Community Advisory Committee with representation from basin sub-
regions, water use sectors, and state and local governments 
Tárcoles  Multi-sector commission with representation from civil society, 
national and local government 
Warta No stakeholder advisory group or organization at time of visit; one 
being established currently 
 
 
Table 8. Financial arrangements associated with basin organization 
Alto Tietê Currently, funding received from earmarked State Water Resources 
Fund.  In the future, water user charges will co-fund basin organization 
activities. 
Brantas Fees from some users (industry, hydropower, and municipalities) cover 
most operation and maintenance activities.  Central government funds 
staff salaries, flood control and major infrastructure projects. 
Fraser Federal, provincial, and local government annual contributions, plus 
funds collected from sponsors of Fraser Basin Council projects 
Guadalquivir Funding from central government plus fees collected from water users 
and water suppliers in the basin 
Jaguaribe Water charges collected by state water resources management 
company, but cross-subsidization from other basins, especially the 
urbanized basin of the Greater Fortaleza region 
Murray-
Darling 
Basin commission funded by national government and states; 
management of Murray River infrastructure by fees on bulk water users 
Tárcoles  Funding currently coming from central government; past support 
provided by foundations and Interamerican Development Bank 
Warta Budget allocation from central government 
 
 The eight cases also varied notably with respect to the continuity of central 
government support from the beginning of the decentralization process to the present.  
Support often includes financial assistance, but also supportive central government 
policies and a demonstrated willingness on the part of central government offices to 
enable adjustments of basin management arrangements when needed.  Table 9 condenses 
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this distinction into two categories, continuous and discontinuous central government 
support since the decentralization process began. 
 
Table 9. Continuity of central government support through decentralization process 
Continuous Discontinuous 






 Undoubtedly there are more factors that could be used to characterize and contrast 
the eight cases, but the ones in Tables 1 through 9 above should suffice for a reasonable 
overview.  Although it is not necessary in comparative case-study methodology to have a 
representative sample, it is important to have substantial differences among cases on 
variables of potential interest.  With respect to everything from the origins of institutional 
development through the details of institutional structure, these eight cases plainly do 
meet that requirement. 
5. Overall Findings and Conclusions16 
We have already presented findings and conclusions specific to each case in a series of 
working papers (Blomquist et al. 2004a,b,c,d,e; Bhat et al. 2004; Formiga Johnsson and 
Kemper 2005a,b)  Table 10 below provides a condensed statement of outcomes of 
decentralization and water management reforms for each case, drawing upon those 
papers.  Also, for convenience of the reader, in an appendix to this paper we have also 
summarized findings for each case with respect to the four main categories of our 
theoretical framework (Tables A-1 through A-4). 
 
Table 10. Summary of reform outcomes and lessons 
Alto Tietê Even after 15 years of reform São Paulo’s new water resource 
management system is not yet fully operational anywhere in the state 
including in the Alto Tietê.  This is closely related to inertia and lack 
of political will on the part of the São Paulo state government to 
adopt some of the “costlier” instruments such as charging for bulk 
water (which would help finance water management activities) and 
full implementation. 
    The presence of committed institutions and, above all, committed 
water resources professionals and civil society organizations seems to 
not have been sufficient to go further because water management 
never reached the top of the state government’s political agenda. 
Several peculiarities of the Alto-Tietê context made it even more 
difficult for river basin bodies to take advantage of their favorable 
conditions and take the lead in coordinating water management.  
                                                 
16 A reviewer has made useful suggestions for revising the order of presentation in this section, which will 
be done in a future version. 
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First, the extent and intensity of water related problems (and 
solutions), typical of highly dense and industrialized regions, 
represent an enormous technical, political and financial challenge. 
Under these conditions, it is harder for stakeholders to identify 
common interests.  Second, the peculiar composition of the Alto Tietê 
committee -- which included among its members powerful state 
government agencies and the municipal government of São Paulo 
municipality – has so far proved to be more of a problem than an 
advantage. Thus far these powerful institutions have not taken the 
committee seriously and it is unlikely that they will throw their 
energies into its activities until the pricing system is implemented.  
    Both the intensity of problems and the lack of mobilization of 
crucial committee members seem, however, to lose importance at 
lower level of management. While the main committee still tries to 
define its roles and powers, the sub-committees have found strong 
reasons for working.  As fora for elaborating and implementing the 
water source protection policy at the local level (among other 
attributions), the sub-committees serve as strong building blocks for 
integrated management in basin.  Indeed, the lowest appropriate level 
for many water management functions turned out to be even smaller 
than the original division of the Tietê river basin into five regions.  
Thus, although important achievements have been made, the 
decentralization process has yet to reveal measurable physical results 
such as the improvement of water quality or the rationalization of 
water use. It is undeniable that the Alto-Tietê committee and its 
subcommittees have already played an important leadership role 
around several issues, a fact that in and of itself provides ample 
justification for replacing the old system. Above all, an extraordinary 
mobilization has occurred around water issues, problems and 
management, even though solving many water-related problems may 
be beyond the capacity of the committees or even of the water 
resources management system as a whole. As long as such decisions 
remain at the individual agency level (both state and municipal), 
decision making will remain fragmented and it is unlikely that key 
policy instruments to curb water demand increases and pollution will 
be implemented. 
Brantas The state company, PJT I, focuses on being a reliable and accessible 
provider for the tasks it has designated authority over: water 
allocation (based on permits issued at the provincial government 
level) and supply, and flood control.  It has implemented a reasonably 
good system of water allocation and management, operates a reliable 
flood forecasting system, and appears to maintain major 
infrastructure in fairly good condition.  It was regarded by 
stakeholders interviewed as successful in providing a source of 
professional and unbiased information, expertise, and mediation 
assistance.  To some degree, its image as neutral and competent is 
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aided by PJT 1’s focus on a few major activities, although this is due 
also to the fact that limits on its authority and funding prevent it from 
addressing the full range of IWRM issues.  Managing water quality, 
catchment conditions, and river ecology remain the responsibility of 
many entities, however, and given their growing importance the 
authority and coordination to address them need to be improved. 
Fraser The NGO approach has provided a means of crossing jurisdictional 
boundaries among levels of government in a federal system where a 
constitution divides authority and one level of government is not 
entirely superior or subordinate to another.  It has allowed the 
integration of First Nations (indigenous) communities and private 
stakeholders in ways that more traditional governmental programs 
have found difficult or impossible.  It has provided a good forum for 
information generation and sharing, since there is less concern over 
who “owns” the information.  It has succeeded in preserving a 
reputation for objectivity and in building a more diverse financial 
base.  One key to this success has been the ability of the council to 
promote the concept of interdependency among stakeholders.  Since 
it is an NGO, the Fraser Basin Council can take on an extremely 
broad range of issues and in a way provides political cover for 
participating agencies.  On the other hand, it must rely on those 
agencies for the implementation of its plans and programs.  The 
council’s reliance upon consensus occasionally slows decision 
making.  On balance, however, the approach represented by the 
Fraser Basin Council has worked well. 
Guadalquivir Several policy changes over the past two decades, combined with the 
EU Water Framework Directive, have moved Spanish water policy 
away from a sole emphasis on supply augmentation and toward 
IWRM.  Policy reform has added new and different responsibilities to 
river basin agencies such as the one for Guadalquivir basin, and 
representation of a broader range of stakeholders on the basin 
agency’s boards and commissions.  Nevertheless, the basin agency is 
perceived by some as still favoring irrigators’ interests and focused 
primarily on supply augmentation rather than a broader range of 
concerns.  Some of the newer functions—water licensing, demand 
management—have been performed with less vigor and with less 
positive results.  Despite substantial investments in supply and 
storage facilities, Guadalquivir’s “water deficit” has not been erased, 
and exposure to droughts remains a principal problem.  Systematic 
efforts to reduce non-point pollution are still lacking, and a 
considerable amount of agricultural water use remains comparatively 
inefficient.  The Andalusian regional government has asserted itself 
as an alternative policy forum, for greater participation by some 
interests and discussion of some issues perceived to be neglected by 
the basin agency. 
Jaguaribe The devolution of federal authority over the management and 
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operation of federal reservoirs to Ceará State has been highly 
effective. Devolution from state to local level has been more partial. 
Although the state agency has decentralized the allocation of strategic 
reservoir waters to local institutions, many traditional water 
management attributions continue under its purview.  Nor has basin 
management in this location incorporated land use or drainage, which 
remain under the control of municipalities.  The creation of sub-basin 
committees and user commissions has increased participation by all 
types of stakeholders, which is itself a major transformation from 
previous practices. Stakeholder involvement has been limited largely 
to negotiating water allocation and resolving conflict, and local 
stakeholders still have no say in some processes that greatly affect 
them.  The financial resources of the sub-basin committees and user 
commissions remain insecure, depending entirely on contributions 
from state government and from their own members. At the state 
level, though, bulk water pricing has represented an important 
change, and has allowed the state company to gradually achieve 
financial stability for its infrastructure operations.  The case of the 
Jaguaribe basin powerfully illustrates that (i) longstanding political 
support is of major importance in the development and 
implementation of water resources management reform, (ii) that 
institutional arrangements for water resources management can 
successfully be adapted to local conditions in order to achieve 
positive outcomes, and (iii) that even with initial conditions that seem 
to not favor change, decentralization can be achieved. One lesson, 
however, cannot be drawn as yet and only the future will tell if the 
strength of a 12-year long decentralization process in water resources 
management, initiated and strongly supported by a succession of 
political leaders, and implemented by highly professional and 
dedicated staff, is sufficient to overcome the current ‘political drought 
period’ that started with the change in state and institutional 
leadership in 2003.  
Murray-Darling Murray-Darling Basin water resource management’s successes in 
gaining intergovernmental cooperation and commitment, instituting 
mechanisms for stakeholder participation, and generating trusted data 
are considerable. In terms of devolution of authority, stakeholder 
participation, and financial self-sufficiency, the arrangements have 
been generally successful. Water resource management is still driven 
by policy elites and audit groups in each state, but much activity is 
carried out at regional levels in local offices with almost complete 
authority for policy implementation (including water sharing).  
Management and operation of dams and irrigation schemes has been 
transferred to entities designed for localized day-to-day management 
and financial sustainability.  Both urban and rural (irrigation) water 
supply infrastructure have been weaned from government funding for 
operation and maintenance and receive a small and steadily 
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decreasing amount of capital funding.  All levels of water 
management are now supported by stakeholder advisory groups. 
Tárcoles  The Tárcoles basin commission was for a period in the 1990s able to 
initiate and lead important basin improvement activities.  
Agribusiness contamination of water, especially from coffee 
processing operations, was reduced through the Voluntary Plan 
Program.  Reforestation efforts championed by the basin commission 
helped slow the degradation.  Changes of leadership at the Tárcoles 
basin commission and its changed relationship with the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy—a change that resulted in more central 
government control but less central government support—have been 
associated with a decline of the commission’s activity, visibility, and 
stakeholder participation.  A number of basin management issues 
remain unaddressed and unresolved.  The Tárcoles basin still lacks 
sewage treatment, and river water quality conditions continue to 
worsen as the basin population grows.  The water rights system in 
Costa Rica inhibits effective demand management.  The current 
concession system does not cover groundwater use, or surface water 
use by public hydroelectric suppliers.  The tariff system for 
agricultural water use continues to base fees on cultivated area rather 
than water use, providing little incentive for efficient water use.  
Furthermore, groundwater use appears to be subject to no control 
whatever though there is evidence of overdraft in the San Jose area. 
Warta The Warta basin illustrates how much institutional creation and 
policy reform can be accomplished in a relatively short period when a 
central government makes and sustains a commitment to 
decentralization and IWRM.  Fifteen years ago, Poland lacked a 
rational system of water tariffs, wastewater discharge controls, water 
resource planning, or river basin-scale organizations.  These are in 
place now, although still quite new, along with bodies at the national, 
provincial and local levels for funding water quality improvements 
and other environmental protection projects.  While much has been 
accomplished, institutional boundaries have not always been clear, 
and some things have proceeded quite out of phase—principally, the 
establishment of the river basin agencies without a revenue source of 
their own, without a structure for basin stakeholder representation and 
participation, and a decade before the passage of the water law that 
largely defines and authorizes their activities.  Organizational 
responsibilities and relationships have been less integrated than 
policy.  Currently there is a substantial gap between the basin-scale 
organizations that have been created in Poland and the activities that 
comprise IWRM, most of which have been assigned to sub-basin 
governments.  Water quality remains a great challenge in the Warta 
basin.  Rivers remain polluted with bacteriological and chemical 
contaminants.  There was a national policy to promote water storage 
facilities such as small reservoirs, but funding has not been adequate 
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to carry it out.  Severe flooding occurred in the Warta basin as 
throughout Poland in 1997, and the risk of flooding has not been 
eliminated. 
 
 This section presents some conclusions across the case studies about important 
factors that were related to the degree of success in gaining stakeholder involvement, 
developing institutions at the river basin level for integrated water resource management, 
and addressing water resource problems.  As discussed below, the factors that appeared 
to make the greatest difference among the cases were the consistency of central 
government political and financial support for the basin management effort, adequate 
revenues for the basin organization and the ability to retain those revenues within the 
basin for water management priorities, effective leadership within the basin, involvement 
of stakeholders in aspects of resource management that affect them directly, and 
perceptions among stakeholders of responsiveness and evenhandedness on the part of 
basin management organizations and officials. 
 In order to present the findings in a comparative framework, they are discussed in 
connection with a series of questions about process and performance of decentralized 
approaches to river basin management. 
Was the active involvement of stakeholders secured?  In most cases, this can be answered 
yes, although there are exceptions and variations as one would expect.  Representation of 
diverse groups of stakeholders, regular and sustained opportunities for interaction, an 
ambitious agenda of basin management issues, and direct connection of basin 
management activities with matters relevant to people’s livelihoods and local 
communities contributed to active involvement in several of the cases we observed. 
 As noted above in Table 7, the river basin organizations in the Warta River in 
Poland and in the Brantas River in Indonesia lacked organized structures for stakeholder 
involvement, so communication between basin management staff and stakeholders in 
those cases was more individualized and less regular.  In the Guadalquivir basin in Spain, 
the number and diversity of stakeholder representatives has been expanded with reform 
and reorganization of the basin management agency, but some stakeholders (particularly 
irrigation communities) are more actively involved than others, and there were 
expressions of dissatisfaction from some other stakeholders with the frequency, 
regularity, and significance of contact with the basin management agency.  In the 
Tárcoles basin in Costa Rica, stakeholder involvement was quite active in the 1990s as 
the basin commission was getting started.  In the Murray-Darling case in Australia, there 
are multiple layers of stakeholder involvement, including rural irrigation companies and 
districts, regional catchment authorities, water service provider associations, a basinwide 
Community Advisory Committee, and state and federal government representation on the 
commission and ministerial council for the basin as a whole.  Local stakeholders 
participated actively with state government personnel in establishing basin management 
organizations in the Alto Tietê basin in Brazil, where sub-basin committees organized 
around “social basin’ boundaries more than hydrological ones continue to enjoy active 
stakeholder participation.  In the Jaguaribe basin in Brazil, participation takes place along 
the river valley where the key infrastructure is located and around strategic multi-year 
reservoirs. However, for strategic reasons, the state government has little interest in 
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having stakeholders from the Jaguaribe basin become actively involved in longer-term 
allocation decisions regarding the transfer of water into the Greater Fortaleza 
Metropolitan basin to meet the state capital’s growing water needs. The Fraser Basin 
Council in Canada has succeeded through regular meeting schedules and a combination 
of basin wide and sub-basin regional councils to secure and maintain a high level of 
stakeholder engagement since its establishment in 1997. 
What factors (from our theoretical framework, or otherwise) appear to be related to 
successful start-up of river basin organizations in these cases?  The commitment of 
governmental support to the creation of stakeholder-based or stakeholder-involved 
organizations was a positive factor at the outset of the Tárcoles , Fraser, Jaguaribe and 
Alto Tietê experiences.  The presence, or the prospect, of valuable infrastructure 
investments became a point of stakeholder interest from the beginning of the 
Guadalquivir and Murray-Darling cases.  The absence of significant cultural conflicts 
among basin stakeholders in most of the cases helped too. 
 Beyond our theoretical framework, there were other factors that proved to be 
important in some of the cases.  One was the presence of a “champion,” an influential 
individual who drew attention to basin problems and conditions, and who possessed the 
entrepreneurial skill to develop the combination of people, information, and finances to 
get a basin-level organization started.  This was particularly important in the Brantas, 
Jaguaribe, Fraser, and Tárcoles cases, and to some extent with the widening of the scope 
of basin management issues in the Murray-Darling basin.  Another factor was the 
presence of severe water resource problems, which proved important in all cases and 
which economic theory would predict but which was not made explicit in our theoretical 
framework.  (This is a “good news-bad news” finding—the “bad news” is that problems 
such as flooding, pollution, scarcity, and/or inter-sectoral conflict have to reach a 
threshold of severity in order to stimulate collective action; the “good news” is that once 
they reach that threshold, collective action often follows.)  A third factor was the 
influence of supra-national entities such as the World Bank or the European Union, 
mentioned previously in Table 4.  Conditions or advice accompanying Bank assistance, 
and the desire for policies that are consistent with the EU Water Framework Directive, 
shaped the establishment of basin organizations, the broadening of water management 
issues toward an IWRM approach, or both. 
Has the active involvement of stakeholders been sustained over time?  The answer to this 
is not simple, because of the differences in stakeholder involvement noted earlier17 and 
the different lengths of time basin management has been undertaken.  Where we did 
observe sustained active involvement, it appeared to be connected with stakeholder 
perceptions that the basin management organizations were engaged in important issues 
and were making (or had made) a positive difference in basin conditions, with 
consistency of governmental support, and with some of the same factors that stimulated 
stakeholder involvement in the first place such as regular and frequent interaction.  These 
factors were present in the Fraser and Murray-Darling cases, at the sub-basin levels in the 
                                                 
17 Cases such as the Warta and Brantas basins, for instance, which had not yet institutionalized particular 
mechanisms for stakeholder involvement by the time of our study, might be categorized as “not applicable” 
with respect to this question. 
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Alto Tietê and Jaguaribe cases, and with respect to irrigation communities in the 
Guadalquivir basin. 
 Stakeholder involvement has waned during the past five years in the Tárcoles 
case, as well as in the Jaguaribe and Alto Tietê cases, and is lower among non-irrigation 
stakeholders in the Guadalquivir case, for similar reasons.  Irregular and less frequent 
commission meetings in recent years and a perceived inconsistency of government 
support were noted by some stakeholders interviewed in the Tárcoles  basin.  In the 
Guadalquivir basin, some non-irrigation stakeholders expressed the view that they 
participated less because they believed their views and interests were not as welcome.  
The Andalusian regional government has even constructed an alternative stakeholder 
forum in that basin, partly as a reaction to that perception among non-irrigation 
stakeholders. In the state of Ceara, a change of government took place with the current 
government returning to more centralized policies. And in the Alto Tietê case, state 
government has never given full political support to some of the key reform agenda 
ingredients that are on the table. Over time, therefore, the activities of the Alto Tietê 
Committee seem to have lost enthusiasm and strength.  
Was stakeholder involvement linked in a substantive way to resource management 
decision making (as distinct from mere stakeholder consultation)?  In most cases, yes.  
Relatively new as well as long-lived river basin organizations had engaged stakeholders 
in substantive basin management decisions.  Stakeholder involvement was more common 
with respect to basin planning, water supply allocation, and infrastructure operation, and 
less common with respect to setting water charges, collecting fees, flood control, 
monitoring basin conditions, altering land uses or infrastructure construction decisions. 
 In the Guadalquivir basin, operations boards that include stakeholders and agency 
staff make reservoir management decisions, a basinwide commission that includes 
stakeholder representatives decides upon the schedule and volume of water storage 
releases each year, and water supplies are allocated among individual farmers by 
management boards in the many irrigation communities of the basin.  In the Jaguaribe 
basin, user committees at the local reservoir scale have a strong say in annual water 
storage and releases.  In the Alto Tietê basin, the river basin committee and sub-basin 
committees are involved in designating headwater protection areas.  Catchment 
management authorities in the Murray-Darling basin are increasingly involved in review 
of land-use changes for possible effects on water and other natural resources, irrigation 
companies or districts set water rates and make allocation decisions, and representatives 
from the three states along the main stem of the Murray River participate in decisions 
about the operation of dams and the management of flows in the river.  During the 1990s, 
stakeholders in the Tárcoles basin were actively involved in a reforestation program and 
in the recruitment and recognition of businesses for participation in a basinwide voluntary 
program to reduce discharge of contaminants to the river and tributaries.  Even the 
nongovernmental Fraser Basin Council—which does not execute policy or implement 
projects directly—holds “State of the Basin” conferences, issues “State of the Basin” 
reports, forms partnerships with other governmental and nongovernmental entities in the 
basin for specific projects, and lends its endorsement to an agenda of basin sustainability 
initiatives that appear to influence the decisions of officials at the local, provincial, and 
federal government levels. 
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 Stakeholder involvement in basin management in the Brantas and Warta basin 
cases has been more extensive with respect to the review of basin plans prepared by 
agency staff than in the making of basin management decisions or the operation of 
projects.  This is not to diminish the importance of stakeholder involvement in planning, 
but simply to distinguish between the scope of stakeholder involvement in those cases 
relative to the other six.  A further note is in order about the Warta case: at the province 
(voivode) level in Poland, representative boards do participate in decisions about the 
allocation of funding for wastewater treatment and other environmental improvement 
projects, although this activity is not organized at the basin scale nor does the regional 
water management authority for the river basin have a direct role in it.  Nevertheless, the 
financial investments made by these provincial bodies are a very important element of 
improving water quality conditions throughout the river basin. 
Did stakeholder involvement translate into more effective resource management?  If so, 
why, and if not, why not?  With respect to reducing exposure to flooding and better 
management of releases from water storage reservoirs, it is possible to say that 
stakeholder involvement and performance improvements in the Brantas, Guadalquivir, 
Jaguaribe, and Murray-Darling cases have gone hand in hand.  The same can be said of 
reduction in the rate of deforestation in the Tárcoles basin, of improved treatment of 
industrial wastewater and reduced use of the river for waste discharge in the Fraser basin, 
and of headwater area protection in the Alto Tietê basin.  Measurable improvements to 
wastewater treatment in the Warta basin have resulted from the financial investments of 
the provincial funds for environmental protection and water management. 
 On the other hand, stakeholder involvement can perpetuate impediments to 
improved water resource management.  Irrigation communities and basin agency 
personnel in the Guadalquivir basin, for example, have devoted decades to the 
construction of additional dams and reservoirs, yet the basin’s annual “water deficit” 
remains in place.  Furthermore, improvements to the efficiency of agricultural water use 
there have been piecemeal, unlicensed uses of water for irrigation continue to grow, and 
the issue of agricultural contributions to water pollution has been addressed only recently 
and partially.  In the Brantas basin, agricultural users consume the largest share of water 
supply but have managed to remain exempt from water tariffs that are paid by municipal, 
industrial, and hydropower users.  In the Tárcoles basin, public hydropower producers 
make the most, albeit non-consumptive, use of surface water yet are exempt from water 
licensing and tariff requirements that apply to other users (including private hydropower 
producers).  IWRM and stakeholder involvement are uniformly promoted in the 
professional and policy literatures as leading toward improved resource management; 
what is less often noted is the prospect for active stakeholder involvement to translate 
into forms of stakeholder protectionism, particularly the political influence of water use 
sectors is asymmetric.  This does not mean that stakeholder involvement and an IWRM 
approach to river basin management are bad ideas, only that a more careful analysis is 
warranted. 
 Whether water management improvements were large or small, and whether their 
benefits and burdens were distributed evenly or unevenly, there were social benefits to 
the functioning of participatory structures and to the establishment of basin-scale and 
sub-basin organizations for water management.  The degrees of success and the longevity 
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of basin management efforts may vary across cases, but we would conclude that the 
social and institutional capital of all eight are richer due to the actions that have been 
taken, and they are in a better position to meet future water management challenges than 
if they had not taken the steps they already have. 
Were improvements in resource management sustained over time and as conditions 
changed?  Despite improvements, significant water resource management problems 
remain in all of the cases we studied.  In several cases, this is due to changing conditions 
to which management entities have not adapted fully.  For instance, the long-lived 
management regime of the Murray-Darling basin is wrestling with more recently 
recognized problems of dryland salinity and deteriorated river ecology.  The equally 
long-lived Guadalquivir basin agency has yet to fully cope with its enlarged 
responsibilities for water licensing and demand management, and with water supply 
reliability and flood protection for a growing and rapidly urbanizing population.  In the 
Warta case, flood risks have diminished and the quality of large-scale municipal and 
industrial wastewater discharges has improved, but lack of integration of water supply 
management with land use development and jurisdictional gaps between the issuance of 
permits and the enforcement of compliance with them have contributed to the rise of 
seasonal water scarcity and accumulating groundwater overdraft in portions of the basin.  
In the Tárcoles case, early successes in raising awareness of the negative impacts of 
deforestation and industrial water discharges have not been sustained, and in the 
meantime the basin’s population and economy have grown rapidly and the problems of 
land use, erosion, and water pollution have continued to increase. In the Jaguaribe case, 
water security in drought conditions for all stakeholders has significantly increased by 
more transparent and effective planning, and operation and maintenance of infrastructure. 
Environmental problems, which used to not even be contemplated due to the overriding 
issue of water scarcity and allocation are now a second-generation issue being raised and 
starting to be addressed.  In the Alto Tietê case, the main problems of Sao Paulo’s water 
supply have not been sufficiently tackled and keep growing. Only at the subbasin levels 
are some activities carried out, but these are not enough for such a metropolitan area. 
 In most of the cases, the principal water resource problems that gave rise to the 
establishment of basin and sub-basin organizations are being addressed, and 
improvements have occurred.  As newer problems have come to the fore and the scope of 
management responsibilities expanded, however, it is too early to tell in several of the 
cases whether and how well the arrangements developed for other problems and 
functions will cope with them. 
What factors (from our theoretical framework or otherwise) appear to be related to the 
longevity of decentralized arrangements in some cases and their demise in others?  The 
consistency of central government support for basin management, stakeholder 
involvement, and water policy reform has emerged as one of the most important factors 
distinguishing cases with greater levels of success and stakeholder participation from 
those with less.  Consistency of support may be as important as magnitude of support 
over the long run.  Magnitude matters, as can be seen in the negative effects of  
insufficient central government funding on basin management in the Warta and Tárcoles  
(post-1998) cases.  By contrast, organizations such as the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission, the Fraser Basin Council, and the Confederacion Hidrografica del 
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Guadalquivir have been able to sustain multi-year basin planning and projects thanks to 
relatively consistent levels of central (and in the Fraser and Murray-Darling cases, 
state/provincial and local) support for their work. 
 Related variables concerning financial resources and financial autonomy mattered 
to longevity as well.  Most revenue generated from water users in the Guadalquivir, 
Murray-Darling, and Brantas basins, for example, remains within or is returned to the 
basin for improvements and operations there.  Basins that are wholly dependent on 
central government allocations (Warta and Alto Tietê, for example) have had a more 
difficult time establishing their own priorities and undertaking substantial projects. 
 The matter of top-down versus bottom-up initiation of reform seems to make a 
difference, as predicted, but this needs to be considered along with other variables from 
our theoretical framework—prior experience at the local level with self-governance and 
service provision, and consistency of central government support through periods of 
transition.  Thus, while stakeholders initiated the creation of basin organizations in the 
Fraser, Murray-Darling, and Tárcoles basins, the first two are in countries with more 
experience of local autonomy than the third, and central government support has been 
more variable in the latter as well 
 As noted earlier, the relatively low levels of cultural conflict among stakeholders 
in most of these cases was a positive factor.  In the Jaguaribe case, differences between 
the metropolitan area of Fortaleza in an adjacent basin and the agricultural communities 
in the Jaguaribe basin from which water is being withdrawn to supply Fortaleza have 
contributed to the persistence of state-level decision making and to the delay in full 
devolution of management functions to the basin level.  The Fraser Basin is another 
exception, where decades of tension between First Nations and the Canadian federal and 
provincial governments was one of the factors that contributed to the decision to form a 
non-governmental basin organization that could incorporate representatives from each. 
 In some basin management arrangements, explicit provisions were made for 
recognizing and involving sub-basin communities of interest.  As noted in Section 2, this 
can be an important element of successful basin management arrangements, especially in 
larger basins and in basins where different water use sectors dominate different areas.  
The Murray-Darling basin management scheme relies strongly upon the states (New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland) and the Australian National 
Territory (Canberra) to manage several aspects on water supply and use within their 
borders, and New South Wales and Victoria have in turn established catchment 
management authorities to organize land use and water protection practices at the sub-
basin watershed scale.  Spanish water law and the structure of the river basin agency in 
the Guadalquivir basin recognize irrigation communities that allow farmers within a 
community to allocate supplies and resolve conflicts.  The Alto Tietê basin contains five 
basin sub-committees capable of giving closer attention to the distinct problems and 
resources of areas within the basin.  The Jaguaribe basin contains user communities 
organized down to the reservoir scale.  The basin management authority in the Warta 
basin has three local offices, although they are engaged primarily in infrastructure 
operation and maintenance and play a very limited role on other aspects of resource 
management.  Even the nongovernmental Fraser Basin Council has regional councils and 
regional coordinators for five sub-basins.  One proposal for enhancing the river basin 
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commission in the Tárcoles has been the establishment of upper, middle, and lower area 
committees, but this has not occurred yet. 
 Finally, we noted earlier the importance of “champions” in getting basin 
management institutions started.  Here, we add that the departure of such a “champion” is 
also a delicate moment in the life of those institutions.  This has been evident in the 
Fraser, Tárcoles , Jaguaribe and to a certain extent Alto Tietê cases.  Nevertheless, the 
institutions in most of those cases have survived and basin management activities 
continue, so it is equally important not to presume that the departure of a champion must 
spell doom for a basin management effort. 
 Table 11 compresses the discussion above into a visual representation of the 
presence or absence (or in some instances, the partial or inconsistent presence) of a 
variety of institutional factors in the eight cases. 
 


















Central government support for creation of 
stakeholder-based organizations X  X  X  X  
Presence of influential leader or “champion”  X X  X ? X  
Presence or prospect of infrastructure investment    X  X   
Presence of severe water resource problems X X X X X X X X 
Influence of supranational organizations X X  X X  X X 
Magnitude of central government support adequate 
for effective decentralization/basin management?  ? X X  X   
Consistency of central government support  X X X  X   
Basin-generated revenue remains in basin  X  X  X   
Basin management reform was “bottom-up” or 
mutually desired X  X   X X  
Social and cultural distinctions among stakeholders   X  X    
Recognition and involvement of sub-basin 
communities of interest X  X X X X  ? 
Active, regular stakeholder participation secured? X  X ? ? X ?  
Stakeholder participation linked with management 
decision making? X  ? X X X ? ? 
Stakeholder involvement associated with improved 
management?  X ? X X X ? ? 
Management improvements sustained over time? ? X X ? ? ?  ? 
X = characteristic clearly and persistently present; 
? = characteristic present in some respects but not others 
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6. Implications for Policy and Research 
One important finding from these case studies is that, while the level of economic 
development of the nation and the basin can clearly make the creation and sustaining of 
basin-level institutions easier or harder, there is no reason to believe that improvements in 
water resource management are limited to wealthier settings.  Notable improvements can 
be and have been realized in a variety of settings, and sometimes very early in the life of 
basin organizations and stakeholder participation initiatives. 
 Although river basins are important hydrologically, ecologically, and 
economically, not all aspects of stakeholder participation and not all decisions and 
activities that contribute to IWRM have to be organized at the basin scale.  As we have 
seen in these cases, a variety of scales have been used.  The “lowest appropriate level” for 
some water resource management functions may therefore be a sub-basin, a local or 
regional unit of government, or a hybrid unit sometimes referred to as the “social basin,” 
(e.g., the basin subcommittees in the Alto Tietê case). 
 In addition, it is vital to recognize that the establishment of participatory and 
decision making structures involves shifts of power, and this can be a controversial and 
complicating factor.  Even in settings where there was a desire to have decentralized 
basin management, power considerations can prevent that desire from being realized so 
that this has not always entirely been implemented.  Efforts by the Andalusian regional 
government to exercise more leadership over basin management in the Guadalquivir case, 
the efforts of users in the Jaguaribe basin to gain more influence in decision making, 
especially with regard to infrastructure, the desire of the state company in Indonesia to 
also take on pollution control which is currently the responsibility of provincial 
government, are only a few examples of the ways in which jurisdictional and other 
power-related considerations are likely to arise.  The political economy will always play a 
role in the water sector and is an important factor to be borne in mind. 
 Finally, for a number reasons described in this paper, decentralization reforms and 
the establishment of river basin management with active stakeholder involvement are 
processes that take time, even decades.  This is why consistency of support is so 
important.  So too is the ability to adapt and modify basin management arrangements in 
response to changed situations.  Central governments and external organizations wishing 
to promote integrated water resources management on a river basin scale should be 
prepared to sustain their commitment to reform, across changes of administration and 
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The following four tables condense findings about the eight basins with respect to the 
four categories of variables in our theoretical framework—contextual factors and initial 
conditions, characteristics of the decentralization process, central-local relationships and 
capacities, and basin-level institutional arrangements.  More detail is available in the 
working papers for each case (Blomquist et al. a,b,c,d,e; Bhat et al. 2004; Formiga 
Johnsson and Kemper 2005a,b). 
 
Table A-1. Summary of contextual factors and initial conditions 
Alto Tietê Despite a favorable socioeconomic context and the initial distribution 
of resources among basin stakeholders seeming to favor reform, the 
political will to advance the changes has proved insufficient. The 
political and environmental complexities of the Alto-Tietê basin seem 
to make it particularly difficult to implement practices involving 
integration and participation of decision making 
Brantas Weak institutions, a poor legal and regulatory framework, ineffective 
bureaucracy, and endemic corruption led, in the aftermath of the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, to policy and institutional reform assisted by 
external donors and based upon macroeconomic management and 
stabilization as well as governmental reform.  Since 1999, the country 
has gradually recovered macroeconomic and political stability. 
Fraser Economic and social conditions are conducive to successful river 
basin management.  The vast majority of land and water resources in 
the Fraser Basin are held by the province of British Columbia, and 
used by private individuals under lease arrangements with the 
government.  Therefore, no one interest or sector of basin users had 
legal immunity for their claims or titles to resource use. 
Guadalquivir While ethnic, religious, or class divisions in Andalusian society do 
not seem to have driven water management issues, economic 
development seems to have had a notable effect.  The Guadalquivir 
basin was poorer and more rural than most of the rest of the country, 
and these conditions contributed to an emphasis on the expansion and 
protection of irrigated agriculture as the central element of the 
region’s economic and social life. 
Jaguaribe At the time that reform began, local conditions in the Jaguaribe basin 
appeared for a number of reasons to be somewhat unfavorable to the 
development of  decentralized and integrated water resources 
management. First, the basin is relatively poor. Second, participatory 
water management ran contrary to the prevailing political culture of 
the Ceará hinterlands (sertão), since until the reforms began, water 
there had historically been considered either a private good, the 
property of the owners of the lands through which it flowed or under 
the control of the government agencies of the reservoirs within which 
it lay (usually DNOCS). Third, Ceará had one of the most entrenched 
oligarchies in the Northeast.  
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Other factors favored reform. At the national level, the transition to 
democracy, that followed the fall of Brazil’s military regime in the 
mid-1980s, was accompanied by broadened acceptance throughout 
Brazilian society of values such as democratization, decentralization, 
and participation in policy making. At the national level an 
unprecedented movement within the technical water resource 
community began to promote integrated water resources 
management. This movement, led in large part by the Brazilian Water 
Resources Association, had a strong impact on the dissemination 
throughout the country of certain management models, such as water 
use rights, pricing, and river basin level management. 
Murray-Darling Overall, the basin was favorable social and economic terrain for the 
development of basin management institutions.  Its semi-arid climate 
makes water issues significant enough to stimulate action, and the 
relative wealth and homogeneity of its population present few 
barriers to such action.  The initial distribution of resources among 
basin stakeholders clearly has favored irrigators in the basin, who 
account for more than 90% of water diversions. 
Tárcoles  The Tárcoles basin is by far the most economically developed in the 
country and there do not appear to be substantial cultural or religious 
differences across groups of basin stakeholders that would inhibit 
cooperation.  Financial resources are, however, a limiting factor.  The 
Tárcoles basin is politically important and reflects inconclusive 
national policy. There seems to be overall reluctance towards 
decentralization to lower levels of decision-making. 
Warta The Warta basin does not feature significant cultural, religious, ethnic 
or other divisions.  Poland’s economic conditions have led to 
financial constraints on the government sector, limiting its ability to 
provide either central funding or revenue autonomy adequate to the 
tasks of IWRM at the basin scale. 
 
 
Table A-2. Summary of decentralization process characteristics 
Alto Tietê The decentralization process in the Alto-Tietê basin is marked by two 
distinct processes: i) decentralization from the state to the basin level, 
which occurred with the creation of the Alto-Tietê Committee in 
1994 and, more recently, it’s water agency, and; ii) further 
decentralization within the basin in 1997/1998, which resulted in five 
sub-committees at lower territorial levels.  
Neither state government not local stakeholders question either the 
need to create complementary deliberative bodies at lower levels or 
the fact that basin management participants should be allowed to 
create and modify institutional arrangements according to their needs 
and circumstances. However, there is no agreement about the extent 
of this decentralization 
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Brantas The pursuit of a strong unitary government has historically been an 
executive response to the sprawling archipelago’s extremely high 
level of cultural, ethnic, language, and economic diversity.  The 
decentralization process has been top-down. Passage of the new 
Water Law, in March 2004, signals central government commitment 
to continued reform of the water resources sector in accordance with 
the agreed action plan developed under the World Bank assisted 
Water Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL). 
Fraser Development of Fraser Basin Council grew out of previous but less 
comprehensive intergovernmental projects.  The construction of 
basin-scale institutional arrangements in the Fraser Basin has been a 
matter of integrating already decentralized organizations and 
jurisdictions.  The extent of central government recognition of local-
level basin governance has been positive. 
Guadalquivir The CHs (Confederaciones Hidrografica) are best thought of as 
central government agencies with representative components, and the 
balance between central control and user participation has varied over 
time.  While basin-scale institutions enjoy the recognition of central 
government officials as legitimate water resource management 
entities, such recognition has not been accompanied by an extensive 
devolution of authority to basin-scale institutions.  CH Guadalquivir 
takes much of its lead from Madrid. 
Jaguaribe The decentralization process in the Jaguaribe basin was marked by 
two distinct processes: i) decentralization from federal to state level, a 
result of the increased technical, institutional and financial capacity of 
Ceará’s water resource management agencies; and ii) decentralization 
from state to local level, which occurred through the creation of 
deliberative bodies at the river basin and lower territorial levels. The 
creation of a state water resources agency (COGERH) was not part of 
the original design called for in the state water law, but resulted from 
the World Bank’s insistence that the state create a water agency with 
management, monitoring and enforcement functions, including 
pricing and the involvement and organization of local stakeholders. 
The fact that in 1997 COGERH took over some previously federal 
management responsibilities represented a major step towards 
decentralization from the federal to state level.  The state-to-local 
decentralization process has been more complex.  It was a top-down 
initiative, and upper echelons at COGERH and the State Water 
Resources Secretariat are increasingly distrustful of the participatory 
decision-making bodies that were created. Although the long term 
impact of these changes on the user commissions and river basin 
committees is still unclear, reform-oriented officials hope that the 
high level of mobilization achieved in the basin over the last ten years 
will make it difficult to undo the advances made thus far. 
Murray-Darling Primary decision making authority predominantly rests at the sub-
basin level with the state governments.  Over time, and with the 
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cooperation and consent of the national government, the states have 
constructed intergovernmental arrangements to control and operate 
Murray River flows and then to address other issues. The process has 
been as much a matter of integration as decentralization.  Central-
level recognition of basin governance and management has been 
complete and consistent. 
Tárcoles  The CRGT (Coordinating Commission for the Río Grande de 
Tárcoles) was essentially a municipal initiative and took an active 
leadership role.  The central government partially devolved authority, 
and was supportive of the CRGT’s efforts, but there was never a full 
recognition of the CRGT’s authority to manage the basin.  Since 1998 
the central government has neither pushed the devolution forward nor 
terminated the commission. 
Warta Creation of river basin agencies and reform of water policy were 
attempted in the same decade (the 1990s) as the overall 
democratization of Polish government, resulting in some uneven 
progress.  Significant responsibilities for water resources planning 
and management have been spread across basin and sub-basin 
entities, and water law reform took several years longer than 
originally envisioned.  The central government has maintained a 
consistent commitment to decentralization and democratization 
reforms, including the local and basin-scale organizations that it 
created, but financial resources have been a problem. 
 
 
Table A-3. Summary of central-local relationships and capacities 
Alto Tietê The advances in state water management capacity have been 
considerable and in some cases crucial for the survival of the basin 
committees in this transitory phase. However, tensions and problems 
exist between the central authorities and the local bodies and basin 
committees are not always effective. Indeed, the São Paulo water 
resources management system as a whole is beginning to show signs 
of breakdown in face of the state government’s incapacity to make it 
fully operational, especially by implementing bulk water charges. 
Water reform in São Paulo seems to need much more time. 
Considering that the reform process is almost fifteen years old, it is 
becoming clear that transaction costs are very high in terms of time 
and money. So much so, that the pioneer state in water reform has 
begun to lag behind others. 
Brantas Much power still resides with Central Government Ministries for 
planning and policy-making. The authority to oversee the 
management and functioning of PJT I (the Brantas River Basin 
Management Authority) lies with the center through KimPrasWil (the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Human Settlement) with the Ministry 
of Finance exercising a fiscal oversight role.  KimPrasWil has 
supervisory control of PJT I.   The Supervisory Board of PJT I, with 
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five members comprised of Central and Provincial Government, 
undertakes general supervision of PJT I’s program, work plan, and 
budget, and answers to the Ministry of Finance and KimPrasWil.  
The Supervisory Board does not have a stakeholder advisory group to 
work with or any other form of stakeholder institution.   It structurally 
reflects the authority of the KimPrasWil and Ministry of Finance over 
basin-level interests.   
Fraser Financial resources and autonomy of the council are relatively strong.  
The council members have, through the Fraser Basin Society and the 
council’s own by-laws, the demonstrated ability to create and modify 
the institutional arrangements with which they work.  The water 
rights system, on the other hand, has strengths and weaknesses.  The 
arrangements governing rights to water and land use allow for 
considerable management flexibility, however, the control of 
groundwater resources is weak and represents a vulnerability in terms 
of the overall basin sustainability effort. 
Guadalquivir Basin level entities such as CH Guadalquivir construct basin level 
plans, but these plans must be submitted for national approval and be 
consistent with the national water plan.  CHs collect and maintain 
revenue of their own for some of the services they provide but they 
also rely on central government funding for functions established and 
determined by central government officials.  CHs have several 
advisory bodies composed of stakeholder representatives, but several 
of those councils also have central government representatives and 
the CH president is still a central government designee.  The central 
government remains free to alter CHs’ governance structure or 
decision making processes with as much or as little stakeholder 
consultation as it chooses, but the basin stakeholders do not possess a 
comparable ability. 
Jaguaribe The devolution of some of federal authority over the management and 
control of reservoirs to Ceará state has been highly effective, since 
COGERH has developed substantial technical, administrative and 
financial management capacities. Currently, COGERH operates and 
manages, through its agreement with DNOCS, all major reservoirs in 
the state, accounting for over 90% of the state’s water storage. But 
other aspects of water management decentralization remain 
underdeveloped.  The state has proceeded only slowly with the 
implementation of groundwater management.  The development of a 
new water use permit system has also been slow.  The basin 
committees (which were supposed to be the most important basin 
institution) are formal institutions that still have not found a de facto 
place in the water management system.  They lack effective technical, 
administrative and financial support.  Contrary to the national 
framework, which places river basin committees and agencies at the 
heart of decision-making about water pricing, Ceará has centralized 
water charging at the state level.  The committees have been limited 
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to information dissemination, consciousness-raising and capacity-
building among local actors and the resolution of water use conflicts. 
Major structural projects continue to be decided solely by the state 
government, especially with respect to supplying water to Fortaleza.   
Conversely, decentralization in the Jaguaribe Basin has gone furthest 
with the user commissions, especially through the negotiated 
allocation of water. However, within COGERH and the SRH (to 
which COGERH is subordinate) there has been resistance to giving 
decentralized bodies greater power over water management. The 
result is that only the sub-basin committees have been legally created, 
and even these have received little real support or authority. 
Meanwhile the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys Commission —where the 
process of participatory decision-making began and has continued 
with great intensity — is still only an informal institution. This 
contradictory situation has created tensions between the sub-basin 
committees and the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys Commission. 
Transformation of water management practices in Ceará appears to 
need more time. 
Murray-Darling Generally, central-local relationships and capacities are favorable to 
integrated water resource management.  The basin management 
participants have the ability to create and modify institutional 
arrangements. There is considerable experience at the local and state 
levels with self-governance and service provision.  One hindrance to 
basin-level integrated water management is the system of water 
rights. A second hindrance is that the organizations in the basin most 
directly associated with integrated resource management (eg., the 
sub-basin catchment management authorities) have virtually no 
financial resources of their own and are dependent on funding from 
state and Commonwealth governments.   
Tárcoles  Financial resources for the basin management effort have always 
been limited, and CRGT has never had its own revenue stream.  This 
has severely limited the commission’s ability to evolve into 
something more than a meeting place.  Cantons and municipalities do 
perform a number of functions, so there appears to be local-level 
experience with self-governance and service provision, rather than an 
excessive centralization of public services.  The ability of any river 
basin commission in Costa Rica to develop and implement effective 
water supply management policies is likely to be hampered also by 
the weak framework of water rights allocation. 
Warta Overall, the water law changes in 1997 and 2001, and the merger 
with the DDWMs (Centrally-appointed District Directorates of Water 
Management) in 1999, have given the RWMAs (Regional Water 
Management Authorities) more responsibilities but not additional 
sources of revenue.  The RWMAs have not fared well in the national 
government’s budgetary process.  The water rights system is 
conducive to IWRM, and the reforms since the 1990s have attempted 
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to add a basin-wide perspective to that system.  Permits for water use 
and water discharge are limited in time and quantity, and approved 
only after consultation with stakeholders about basin conditions.  
Fees associated with non-permitted actions or with permit violations 
provide incentives to users and also a revenue source for 
environmental improvement projects.  Other reforms (such as 
transferability of permits) have yet to be undertaken, but most 
elements of the institutional infrastructure of a water rights system 
compatible with IWRM are in place. 
 
 
Table A-4. Summary of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Alto Tietê All of the new institutions defined in the water law have been 
formally implemented, however, their operation is still marked by 
imprecision and institutional overlap largely as a result of the varying 
performance of the public representatives. Gaining influence over 
state programs is the main challenge for all basin committees in 
Brazil, especially for those with little or no capacity for implementing 
a water pricing system. The subcommittees are generally considered 
more dynamic, more effective and more important than the main 
committee. The most important role of the subcommittees is to deal 
with making water resources protection and urban expansion 
compatible through the implementation of the State Water source 
Protection Law of 1997. The Watersource Protection law recognizes 
that simple prohibition and policing measures for protecting strategic 
water supply sources have had perverse effects. The new approach is 
a dramatic departure from São Paulo’s traditional sectoral approach 
to water quantity and quality, which separated the management of 
water from its environmental aspects, especially water pollution and 
land use. 
Brantas PJT I is a state-owned company with clearly delineated management 
responsibilities and a profit motive.  This arrangement has permitted 
the company to (i) focus on the river basin as the management unit, 
and (ii) focus on management rather than development and 
construction.  Importantly, this structure has also endowed the 
company with credibility that the funds it receives from water users 
will be reapplied in the basin, an important condition to ensure 
stakeholders’ willingness to contribute to basin management 
expenses.  PJT I shares responsibility with and ultimately is 
subservient to other political entities at provincial and national levels 
with respect to the development of water resources management 
policy and allocation priority. 
Fraser The Fraser Basin Council was designed for stakeholder information 
sharing and communication.  It also provides a means for 
stakeholders to enter into agreements to take actions to improve basin 
conditions, and to resolve conflicts.  The council has emerged as the 
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paramount deliberative body in the basin.  In its capacity as a non-
governmental organization funded through a non-profit society, 
however, the council has limited ability to implement projects.  It 
often must hand off projects to other entities for implementation. At 
times even the council members are not entirely clear what actions 
are within the council’s scope. 
Guadalquivir While geographic boundaries of the river basin and CH Guadalquivir 
fit well, institutional boundaries are less clear.  The basin-level 
institutional arrangements do recognize sub-watershed communities 
of interest within the basin.  However, only irrigation user 
communities have formal recognition in both national law and the CH 
organizational structure.  Basin-level institutional arrangements are 
structured to provide fora for information sharing and communication 
among basin stakeholders and between stakeholders and CH staff.  
The effectiveness of these structures varies. 
Jaguaribe Water allocation is the most prestigious activity in the basin, with the 
greatest local impact and hence the greatest capacity to mobilize local 
actors. This importance has recently led some representatives of the 
Executive Board of most sub-basin committees to argue that the 
Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valley Commission should be dismantled, with 
the transfer of its responsibilities to the committees, as occurred in 
Ceará’s Curu River Basin. This would involve a fundamental 
rearrangement in basin institutions, since four of the five sub-basin 
committees are involved with the regulated valleys. In the Curu basin, 
the transfer of power from commission to committee was more 
simple because the territorial jurisdiction of the user commission fell 
entirely within the geographical area of a single committee. 
While the committees and the Jaguaribe-Banabuiu User Commission 
are sources of controversy, all actors in the basin and at the state level 
have shown support for the 36 reservoir user commissions. The 
allocation process they engage in is similar to that carried out by the 
Jaguaribe-Banabuiú Valleys Commission, but the decisions have only 
very localized impact and transaction costs are lower. Usually, the 
commissions include only users or groups of users directly affected 
by water allocations in the area of hydrological influence of a single 
reservoir, since members are mostly made up of organizations 
working in the perimeter of the reservoirs, and in the immediate 
downstream area. Despite the current uncertainties concerning 
institutional boundaries, both user commissions and basin committees 
have been promoting the resolution of water use conflicts, with the 
support of COGERH. They have come to be perceived as the 
legitimate forum for negotiating conflicts in terms of water allocation 
and quantitative use, and for airing other controversial issues related 
to water quality and environmental degradation. 
Murray-Darling There are basin-level governance organizations and sub-basin 
organizations, each with firm recognition and considerable support 
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from the state and commonwealth governments.  The states 
themselves are recognized as communities of interest within the river 
basin, as are a number of stakeholder communities represented on the 
Community Advisory Committee.  Basin users and policy makers 
have an array of means by which to negotiate and enter into 
agreement for committing and combining resources for projects and 
programs to improve basin conditions.  Monitoring of basin 
conditions is performed regularly and then consolidated by the 
Commission staff. Clarity of institutional boundaries has been 
somewhat reduced by the introduction of the relatively new 
catchment management bodies. It is less clear how conflicts between 
sub-state and sub-basin entities such as a local government and a 
catchment management body, or between catchment management 
bodies etc. would be addressed. 
Tárcoles  Once it lost its central government support and its dynamic initial 
leadership, the CRGT’s status and composition left it vulnerable to 
becoming more of a discussion forum than a governing body.  The 
prevailing and traditional view that water has to be managed by its 
uses (drinking, irrigation, hydropower, etc) rather than in an 
integrated fashion has been reflected and reinforced by Costa Rican 
laws.  There is considerable fragmentation and territorialism among 
agencies and institutes at the central government level.  Likewise, at 
the local level, there is little inter-jurisdictional cooperation and 
coordination among municipalities, which have been gaining interest 
in entering water planning and water service business activities. 
Warta Management of the Warta River basin is substantially dispersed and 
polycentric. This federal approach, with responsibilities spread across 
levels and units of government, allows for the recognition of sub-
basin communities of interest, and provides overlapping layers of 
monitoring and enforcement of water management regulations.  The 
federated structure does not, however, lend itself to clarity of 
institutional boundaries or a close matching of jurisdictional 
boundaries to basin boundaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
